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Abstract16
Internationally, pressure is being put on governments and regulators to develop more modern17
forms of regulation that deliver more for less and in better ways. This review considers the18
ways in which one large regulator, the Environment Agency for England and Wales, has19
responded to such pressure by developing and implementing risk-based approaches to20
regulation. After exploring the context for and key elements of risk-based environmental21
regulation, we consider the evolving influence of such approaches. We discuss the impacts22
of risk-based approaches against the UK Government’s principles for better regulation and23
against the key criteria for policy evaluation before considering some of the key challenges24
that still need to be addressed in this area of regulatory activity. These relate to the need to i)25
2understand best practice and promote consistency in risk based regulation; ii) develop1
reliable, responsive forms of risk assessment and monitoring; iii) build capacities for2
responsive risk regulation; iv) evaluate the influence of different regulatory styles; and v)3
better understand the potential role of the private sector.4
5
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1. Introduction8
Driven by concerns about public sector expenditure and private sector competitiveness,9
many commentators have long been critical of the role that regulation plays in modern10
economies. Gunningham and Grobasky (1999) encapsulate these criticisms suggesting that11
regulations ‘are not effective in delivering their purported goals; or efficient in doing so at12
least cost; nor do they perform well in terms of other criteria such as equity, administrative13
viability or political acceptability’. Regulation has therefore been seen to perform badly14
when measured against all of the key criteria for policy evaluation. However, command and15
control regulation remains an important policy instrument, and broader forms of regulation16
are emerging, centred, for example, around market-based or information-based instruments.17
As a consequence, pressure is being put on governments and regulators to develop better (or18
more modern) forms of regulation that deliver more for less and in better ways. Risk-based,19
or more correctly, risk-informed regulation is one contributor to this debate (e.g. Rothstein et20
al., 2006).21
Internationally, there has been considerable emphasise placed on the need to develop22
better regulation in recent years. The OECD for example first issued its influential23
recommendations for regulatory reform in 1997; these subsequently evolved into the OECD24
Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality and Performance in 2005 (OECD, 2005). At a25
3European level, the EU initiated a drive towards better regulation in 2002, and has published1
three strategic reviews of better regulation in the EU since 2006 (c.f. European Commission,2
2009). The UK has been an active participant in these international and European debates and3
domestically the UK government’s Better Regulation Task Force has been an influential4
voice within government since its creation in 19971. It has called for regulators to adhere to5
its principles of better regulation by ensuring that regulations are targeted, proportionate,6
consistent, transparent and accountable.7
As a regulator that employs ca. 12,000 people and has an annual budget of over £18
billion, the Environment Agency has been developing its response to the better regulation9
agenda for some years. It has done this most notably through the adoption of risk based10
approaches to regulation in its broadest sense, that seek to focus scarce regulatory resources11
on the highest risks and the worst performers, thereby, it is hoped, securing sustainable12
environmental outcomes, delivering public sector efficiency gains and reducing business13
burdens.14
After examining recent experiences with risk-based regulation in the Environment15
Agency, this commentary highlights some key gaps in the knowledge base and some of the16
future challenges in the field. We conclude by considering the extent to which risk-based17
approaches have enabled, or could in the near future allow the Environment Agency to18
continue to improve the implementation of the principles of better regulation and the19
performance (i.e. the efficacy, efficiency, equitability, administrative viability and political20
acceptability) of environmental regulation.21
22
2. Risk based environmental regulation23
1Its growing influence is reflected in the adoption of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act of 2006 and creation of the
Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform in 2007.
4Reflecting the broader international agenda on better regulation, risk-based environmental1
regulation has been explicitly promoted in the UK for over ten years (Parliamentary Office of2
Science and Technology, 1996; Halfacree, 1998). As well as being driven by the better3
regulation debate above, it arose through an increased emphasis on better risk governance in4
Government departments (Interdepartmental Liaison Group on Risk Assessment, 1998;5
OXERA, 2000; Hampton, 2005; Strategy Unit, 2002) and agencies following events such as6
the BSE (House of Commons, 2000) and foot and mouth crises, and the associated concerns7
about poor public trust in Government decisions on risk (House of Lords, 2000; ESRC8
Global Environmental Change Programme, 2000; Green Alliance, 2000; House of Lords,9
2006). Given that it has evolved rapidly since its adoption, it is our view that there is10
sufficient operational experience among regulators (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Pollution,11
1995; Environment Agency, 1997; European Commission, 1998; Department of12
Environment, Transport and the Regions, 1999; Department of Environment, Transport and13
the Regions, 2000) to reflect on the contributions that risk-based environmental decision14
making (Department of the Environment, 1995; DETR and the Environment Agency, 2000)15
can make towards modern or better environmental regulation.16
The Environment Agency has wide-ranging regulatory responsibilities for flood risk17
management and environmental protection. It adopts environmental risk assessment to18
inform its decisions at both the strategic and operational levels. Strategically, the Agency19
leads Government on the application of environmental risk assessment, with the government20
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) setting the policy context and21
direction (Defra, 2000). At the operational level, the Environment Agency requires22
environmental risk assessments to inform its decision making and, by virtue of its generalised23
powers, may request a risk assessment of any operation it considers may have a detrimental24
impact on human health and the environment. Guidance on environmental risk assessment25
5and management is in place and implemented (Pollard, 2001; Pollard, 2002); several Agency-1
administered regimes are noted as being risk-based (e.g., contaminated land, waste2
management, flood risk management, process industry regulation, river basin management);3
and risk-informed regulatory processes are in place for targeting proportionate regulation,4
securing efficiency gains and informing workforce (resource) planning.5
Many of the risk-informed regulatory processes are based on the application of what is6
known as ‘operator and pollution risk appraisal’ (OPRA) (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of7
Pollution, 1995; Environment Agency, 1997; Environment Agency, 1997). OPRA seeks to8
assign a ranking to regulated sites according to their innate hazard and the capacity of the9
operator to manage the likelihood of these hazards being realised – the operator’s10
demonstrable performance in risk management. OPRA thus assumes that environmental risk11
management is, by a large part, determined by the competency of an organisation to manage12
the hazards associated with its’ operations. OPRA is designed to enable the Agency to focus13
its attentions on the higher risks and worse performers, for example by informing the choices14
that managers make over how often front line regulators should visit premises and what they15
should look for. It may, in some circumstances, also help its officers to decide how much16
discretion they should apply during visits and how to balance their regulatory effort between17
issues (events occurring now) and risks (potential future issues). Initial work on OPRA18
provided valuable insight into the role of risk-based regulation, the choice of regulatory styles19
and tools, and the influence these can have on driving business behaviours.20
21
3. The influence of risk-based environmental regulation22
With respect to the development of risk-based regulation, regulated businesses have23
welcomed approaches that are risk-based – these are seen to make sound business sense24
(Confederation of British Industry, 1998; Confederation of British Industry, 1999). For good25
6operators, these initiatives are likely to result in investments that would be made anyway on1
the grounds of responsible corporate governance, and are thus supportable in scientific and2
business terms. The Agency’s current operator performance assessment seeks to rank the3
maturity of an operator’s environmental performance by reference to key attributes. Many4
regulated sectors (e.g. United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association, 1999) have risk-5
based approaches in place to guide operations, reduce business exposure and lessen business6
interruption losses. ‘Best-in-class’ organisations are better at managing risks wisely, learning7
from failure, and they exhibit resilience (robustness to shock) and agility (adaptive8
management and forward-looking) in response to an evolving business climate. Specifically,9
they balance business risk and opportunity in a mature fashion that ensures exposures are10
minimised and strategic competitive advantage is secured. Organisations competent in risk11
management recognise this maturity of capability is not secured solely through having risk12
frameworks, risk assessment manuals, audit trails, risk champions and risk registers in place.13
They assess their risk maturity (MacGillivray, 2008; IACCM, 2003) because it: (i) helps14
formalise their appetite for risk; (ii) makes more explicit the role of the group risk manager;15
(iii) provides opportunity for evaluating the implementation of risk management on the16
ground – that is, a reality check against high-level, corporate statements on risk; and (iv) it17
builds sustained corporate value. The risk management benchmarking tools now applied18
within high reliability sectors have value in the context of self-regulation for high performing19
sectors.20
Securing evidence (Pollard, 2008) for the environmental outcomes mediated by modern21
regulation infers that causal links are established between regulatory style and environmental22
improvements (National Audit Office and Better Regulation Executive, 2007). Among the23
issues and observations raised by the Hampton implementation review of the Environment24
Agency’s progress (Better Regulation Executive and National Audit Office, 2008)are that:25
7(i) the Environment Agency has made encouraging progress in implementing the1
Hampton principles;2
(ii) better regulation is certainly in the language of the organisation, but not yet embedded3
throughout its culture;4
(iii)there appears to be scope for OPRA to be used more effectively to incentivise5
compliance and inform risk-based interventions;6
(iv)the Agency is currently unable to demonstrate a causal link between day-to-day7
regulatory activities and outcomes;8
(v) it is not clear whether it is prioritising its resources on those sectors, emissions or9
activities which are most damaging to the environment” (para 95);10
(vi)the quality and impact of inspections seems to depend on the competence and11
confidence of individual inspectors – some inexperienced staff appear to lack the12
confidence to exercise balanced risk-based judgements;13
Establishing causality in this sense (iv, above) is not easily achieved given the confounding14
factors influencing environmental change and the multiple actors with this common interest.15
Weighted lines of evidence may support (or otherwise) the relationship between regulatory16
style and outcome (McPherson, 2008). Weight-of-evidence approaches (Krimsky, 2005)17
may use influence diagrams, evidential support logic, and Bayesian belief nets (Pourret,18
2008; Schum, 1994) as visual aids to support the presentation of cause and effect. There is an19
established literature for weight of evidence assessments, developed in the fields of public20
health medicine (Hrudey, 2003), forensic science and radioactive waste management, with21
some applications to environmental risk and a history of using Bayesian methods, for22
example in the regulation of water utilities (O’Hagan, 2007). Individual environmental risk23
assessments frequently make use of data, concepts and assumptions for which a range of24
evidence of varying quality exists. In using assumptions to support risk assessments, risk25
8analysts frequently need to select between competing theories (e.g., low dose extrapolation),1
between a range of individual baseline studies (e.g., arsenic in drinking water) or from a2
palette of future environmental scenarios (e.g., climate change). Such analyses involve3
evaluating both complementary and potentially conflicting lines of reasoning, the direction4
and weight of which must be assessed in support of a specific qualitative or quantitative line5
of argument. Assembling such evidence within a framework of precaution, whilst also6
guided by requirements for proportionate levels of intervention, has long been a requirement7
of the safety cases prepared for radioactive waste disposal. Equally the approach has8
application to the management of exposures from engineering nanomaterials.9
Alongside tools to integrate evidence, effective environmental decision making needs to10
face up squarely to key value tradeoffs. Value trade-offs are ubiquitous in regulation.11
Examples include the tradeoffs between efficacy, efficiency and equity, or public good and12
private profit, or in cases where regulatees face choices between visible and reassuring13
remediation strategies versus invisible but possibly more effective ones (monitored natural14
attenuation for contaminated groundwaters). For these decisions, the Environment Agency15
has been a sponsor of systematic multicriteria (or multiattribute) decision analysis (MCDA;16
Belton, 2002; Dodgson, 2000) which provide a framework within which value trade-offs can17
be made explicit. Agency guidance on best practicable option appraisal for radioactive waste18
disposal at nuclear sites (Environment Agency and Scottish Environment Protection Agency,19
2004; Egan, 2002), for example, recommends nuclear operators undertake a participatory20
multicriteria appraisal exercise as part of the choice of disposal technology. The rationale21
offered is that this not only ensures the regulatee takes into account the views of local22
stakeholders in the technology choice, but that it also provides a framework for discussion23
between regulator and regulatee. This is in line with experience in other countries, where24
multicriteria approaches have been used in heavily regulated environments as a device to25
9make explicit and balance competing demands from a range of stakeholders, for example by1
energy companies BC Gas and BC Hydro in Canada (Keeney and McDaniels 1992; Hobbs2
and Horn 1997; Keeney and McDaniels 1999). However, there are a range of different3
philosophies of how MCDA (broadly conceived) should be applied, particularly for4
environmental applications (Renn, 1993; Gregory, 1992) and the question of what works best5
in a regulatory setting seems to be an open one.6
Finally, as to the application of different regulatory styles, the adoption of a risk-based7
approach has enabled the Agency to engage with firms in a more responsive way that targets8
scarce regulatory resources on the higher risks and the worse performers. Although it could9
be argued that regulators have been using their discretionary powers to do this for many10
years, OPRA has given the Agency a more robust way of generating evidence on risk that can11
be used to support the adoption of different styles in a relatively clear, consistent and12
transparent way. When coupled with a similarly clear and transparent enforcement policy,13
this has enabled the Agency to adopt a sanctions-based regulatory style for the higher risks14
and worse performers (something called for by central government through the Hampton and15
Macrory Reports (Hampton, 2005; Macrory, 2006), and a more cooperative compliance-16
based approach for the lower risk and better performers (Gouldson, 2004). In theory (Ayres,17
1994), such an approach can deliver more targeted and proportionate forms of regulation in a18
more consistent, transparent and accountable way, thereby satisfying the Government’s19
principles for better regulation. It can also deliver efficiency gains for regulators, who are20
able to focus their resources more effectively, and for the more compliant operators who may21
be regulated less intensively. As long as the basis for risk-based decision making is22
communicated effectively, it could also enhance stakeholder trust in, and therefore the23
political acceptability of, environmental regulation.24
10
This interactive aspect of regulation – the fact that one is dealing with a relatively small1
number of informed regulatees who have objectives of their own, and will respond to their2
perceptions of regulator behaviour - is one of the critical aspects of regulatory decision3
making. Understanding this complex relationship requires drawing on a range of insights4
from a number of academic disciplines. In public administration, for example, the idea of5
‘relational distance’ has been helpful: the argument has been made, where inspectors are6
drawn from a different background from inspectees, that they are more likely to take a tough7
sanctions-based approach, and where they are drawn from a similar background, they are8
more likely to take a gentler compliance-based approach (Hood, 1999; Bevan, 2006). Formal9
approaches to examining this interaction, particularly in the area of monitoring and10
enforcement, have attracted attention from environmental economists in the UK and11
internationally, particularly in the US (see the extensive collection of readings in Russell12
2003). Despite the volume of work on this issue, and attempts by such analysts in countries13
such as Germany (Avenhaus 1994) and Denmark (Hansen, Krarup and Russell 2006) to14
develop usable tools based around available practice and data, we are not aware of similar15
tools having been passed into routine operational use in day-to-day management in the UK.16
17
4. Challenges with risk-based regulation18
There is, therefore, an accumulation of experience in the design and application of risk19
based regulation in the Environment Agency and an ongoing programme of policy-oriented20
research that supports the Agency’s initiatives in this field (Table 1). Although the outcomes21
of risk-based approaches have yet to be subjected to rigorous evaluation, there is a general22
belief that risk based approaches do lead to better regulatory outcomes.23
When considered against the UK government’s principles for better regulation, risk based24
approaches are seen as the main way of moving beyond a ‘one size fits all’ approach, and as25
11
delivering more targeted forms of intervention. Drawing on the evidence base provided by1
new forms of risk assessment, risk based approaches are also seen to provide more2
proportionate forms of intervention. However, it is not yet explicitly clear that risk based3
approaches are applied by reference to the same set of overarching principles across different4
domains (i.e. the regulation of the different risks associated with climate change, flooding,5
radioactive waste, toxic pollution etc.), at different levels (i.e. senior managers taking6
strategic decisions, front-line managers taking operational decisions, front-line regulators7
taking ‘street level’ decisions) or in different sectoral (i.e. commercial, industrial,8
agricultural) or geographical areas of Agency operation. Furthermore, while schemes such as9
OPRA make the basis for regulatory decisions more transparent and accountable to10
regulatees, it is not yet clear that risk-based approaches have made regulatory activities more11
transparent and accountable to the public, despite Agency efforts to develop new forms of12
engagement and communication (Irving et al., 2007).13
When considered against the standard criteria for policy evaluation, it is assumed that risk14
based approaches lead to more efficient regulation, both for the public sector as scarce15
regulatory resources can be applied in a more targeted way and for the private sector as16
business burdens for the better performing firms and sites are reduced through lighter touch17
regulation. It is also hoped that it leads to more effective regulation as it increases the18
incentives for compliance through the prospect of lighter touch regulation, and the dis-19
incentives for non-compliance through the prospect of more intensive regulation and the20
imposition of higher sanctions. Because of these assumed incentives, risk based approaches21
are popular with politicians and businesses, but there has been some concern amongst broader22
stakeholder groups that better regulation actually means less regulation and that the23
distributional impacts of risk based approaches are not yet clear.24
12
A fuller and more rigorous evaluation of the extent to which risk based approaches secure1
positive outcomes as measured against the criteria mentioned above would test these2
assumptions and strengthen the evidence base that underpins this aspect of Agency3
operations. It would provide critically important feedback to enable institutional learning4
within the Agency. By providing clear measures of performance, it could also enhance the5
transparency and accountability of, and therefore potentially build trust in, risk based6
approaches to regulation. Research to this effect is now underway within the Agency.7
Related to the requirement for fuller and more rigorous evaluations of outcomes, there are8
a number of other more specific challenges facing the Environment Agency:9
i) Understanding best practice and promoting consistency in risk based regulation10
The Environment Agency is not alone in adopting risk-based approaches. Private sector11
organizations engaged in activities such as insurance, auditing and certification, technology12
supply and business development clearly have significant levels of expertise and experience.13
Regulators in other countries and in other domains also have relevant insights that could14
inform the development of a best practice model of risk regulation, perhaps most notably15
from the Health and Safety Executive. Potentially, both public and private sector bodies in16
the UK have data sets that could be combined to develop a more integrated risk regulation17
framework. The Environment Agency could benefit from reviewing other models of risk18
management and risk based regulation in such private and public organisations. Finally, there19
is a diversity of experience within the Agency that could be evaluated to develop a best20
practice model of risk-based regulation that could be applied more consistently across the21
Agency. Initiatives in all of these areas would help to convince the Agency’s key22
constituencies and stakeholders that it understood and was consistently applying best practice23
in risk based regulation. A valuable initiative is the ongoing Agency research into24
13
monitoring the effectiveness of risk-based decisions, and collation of Agency projects where1
risk-based decision-making has been at the heart of the decision process.2
ii) Developing reliable, responsive forms of risk assessment and monitoring3
Clearly risk-based approaches rely on risk assessments and on-going monitoring. Some4
measures of risk are routinely assessed and monitored in formalised processes that provide a5
transparent and defensible basis for risk-based decision making. However, other more6
subjective or experiential measures of risk are harder to measure in a formal way, and there7
are ill-defined issues about how different stakeholders might meaningfully participate, and8
how different forms of risk perception or tolerance should be taken into account. Equally9
unclear is the extent to which risk data is time and context specific, and whether existing10
forms of monitoring are sensitive enough to detect subtle but ultimately extremely important11
changes in risk management capacities or cultures in regulated firms. By developing new12
risk assessment and monitoring techniques that respond to these challenges, the Agency may13
be able to enhance the efficacy, efficiency and equitability of risk based approaches. A14
critical step forward has been the Agency’s work on strategic risk assessment (Pollard, 2004)15
and its attempts to better characterize environmental harm through comparative risk16
assessment (Environment Agency, 2005). This ongoing risk policy research is likely to17
continue to inform the Agency’s strategy and form the basis for assessments of efficacy and18
efficiency.19
iii) Building capacities for responsive risk regulation20
As well as requiring appropriate forms of monitoring, the Agency needs to build on its21
existing capacities for risk based decision making. Given the nature of the available22
evidence, the significance of uncertainty and ignorance and the range of sometimes23
competing risk perceptions, stronger and possibly more open, inclusive and accountable24
frameworks for multi-criteria or multi-attribute decision making are needed. One of the key25
14
challenges here is to resolve the tensions between the need for rapid, responsive and evidence1
based forms of decision making and calls for more open, inclusive and deliberative forms of2
decision making. Trade-offs between the speed or efficiency, the quality or efficacy and the3
fairness or equitability of risk based decision making need to be better understood and4
addressed. Finally, the Agency will be challenged more and more to ensure that it has5
resources that can be rapidly redeployed, and the agility to switch between regulatory styles6
in response to changing levels of risk. By building its capacities to act in these ways, the7
Agency would be able to respond to the competing pressures that it commonly encounters in8
a well informed and balanced way.9
iv) Evaluating the influence of different regulatory styles10
While a limited body of research has considered the influence of national styles of regulation11
(Vogel, 1986; Gouldson, 2004) there has been little or no research on the influence that12
different regulatory styles can have when applied in combination. It is normally expected13
that a risk-based approach that regulates lower risks and better performers less intensively14
and that enables scarce resources to be redirected towards the higher risks and worse15
performers will, in aggregate, lead to more effective outcomes (i.e. lower overall levels of16
risk/better overall levels of environmental performance). However, it may be that the17
opposite is true; intensive scrutiny from regulators maybe the main driver of compliance in18
better performing firms, so lighter touch regulation may, over time, lead to lower levels of19
compliance amongst that category of firm; whilst intensive regulatory scrutiny may under20
some circumstances prevent the worse performing firms from developing the capacities and21
cultures needed to manage risks and improve performance. More research is needed on the22
extent to which different styles (and combinations of style) can build capacities, strengthen23
cultures and change behaviour in different types of regulated operator. This would enable24
15
more targeted and tailored approaches to regulation to emerge that both improve1
environmental outcomes and reduce business burdens.2
v) Understanding the role of the private sector3
Increasingly, it is acknowledged that regulatory agencies do not have all of the powers,4
resources and information needed to regulate risks effectively. Indeed, some have suggested5
that we are witnessing a shift from state-centred regulation where powers are concentrated in6
regulatory bodies such as the Environment Agency to de-centred forms of governance, where7
powers are dispersed in broader networks of public, private and civic actors (Black, 2001;8
Gouldson, 2007). However, the range of roles that private actors such as insurers,9
consultants, trade associations, business development agencies and regulated firms can play10
in achieving public interest goals has yet to be fully investigated. A key issue is whether, and11
under what conditions, the Agency might transfer some of its responsibilities to the private12
sector. An obvious example relates to the role of private regulations such as environmental13
management systems standards, where the Agency has considered giving ISO14001 certified14
sites a lighter touch. However, research has questioned the extent to which ISO1400115
guarantees improvements in environmental performance (Dahlström, 2003), and there are16
major concerns about the accountability of private sector organisations and about their17
capacity to regulate firms they have a commercial relationship with. Even where these can be18
addressed, there remain concerns about transaction costs and risk as it is not clear that basing19
aspects of the regulatory process on complex relationships between regulators and a20
potentially wide range of private actors would be any cheaper or more reliable than21
continuing to rely on the Agency to deliver risk based approaches. Being clear on this would22
enable the Agency to better understand when and under what conditions it may be23
appropriate to delegate some of its powers to private actors.24
25
16
Conclusions1
Risk based approaches are being widely employed within the better regulation agenda2
(OECD, 2006). They can be used to shape regulatory interventions and prioritise preventative3
controls (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007), hopefully generating4
better (and in particular more effective and efficient) outcomes. Within this paper, we have5
reviewed existing experiences with risk-based approaches, but we have also highlighted some6
of the challenges that need to be addressed if risk-based approaches are to contribute fully to7
the realisation of modern or better regulation.8
We adopt preventative risk management because we seek to avoid the unwarranted9
incidents that could lead to environmental harm. Though advocates of the benefits of risk-10
based regulation, we sound in closing a note of caution on what we perceive to be a creeping11
economic rationalism within regulation. When designed well, piloted and implemented with12
feedback, risk-based regulation can provide a sound basis for distinguishing greater risks13
from lesser ones, and for investing resources in risk management proportionate to the risks14
posed. However, it is important to acknowledge that these regulatory processes may also15
incur risk, unless the consequences of resource trade-offs are fully understood and, for certain16
consequences, guarded against. In other words, whilst risk-based approaches promise better17
regulation, if they prioritise efficiency over efficacy they also risk contributing to regulatory18
failure with potentially significant impacts on human health and the environment. We19
therefore suggest that risk-based approaches should be explored, but in a precautionary way20
where reductions in the efficacy or reliability of regulation are not risked in the pursuit of21
efficiency gains.22
23
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Table 1 Recent Agency-funded research on risk-based regulation1
2
Research question Addressed by Report number Date
How should we manage conflicts in expert
opinion on risk?
Understanding risk cultures. Supporting
consistency in environmental risk assessment.
CEH workshop report.
E2-064 2002
What opportunities exist to align risk-based
regulation with corporate initiatives on
business risk management?
Dames and Moore review of current initiatives
in corporate risk management
E2-056 2002
How should we compare environmental risks
of strategic importance?
Reviews and methodology for strategic and
comparative risk assessment. National Centre
for Risk Analysis and Options Appraisal-Galson
Sciences case studies. Review of comparative
risk assessment tools
E2-041
SC050030
2002
2007
How is operator environmental performance
and environmental risk are recognised in the
regulatory
Article 10 of the revised Eco-management and
Audit Scheme regulation requires member
states to take steps to ensure that the work of
EMAS verifiers and the regulators is not
duplicated. This report indicates what work has
been undertaken in other member states in this
regard.
P6-005 2002
How sound are the Agency's environmental /
business risk criteria in order to ensure its
practicality, robustness and credibility
Tenaco Limited report. E2-055 2003
Does societal concern lead policy makers to
develop more stringent risk management
objectives and standards?
Report of a one-day workshop SC030032 2004
How do the characteristics, functions and
approaches to influencing used by special
interest groups impact of the Agency's work?
University of Surrey. Study aims to assist staff,
particularly at the local level, to engage
effectively with them as a part of their regular
activities and around contentious issues
SC020067 2004
How should we involve stakeholders in risk
assessment-risk management decisions?
National Centre for Risk Analysis and Options
Appraisal - University of Birmingham study
SC000009 2004
What do internal Agency staff understand by
risk-based regulation?
Environmental Policy, Risk and Forecasting
internal questionnaire
Internal
audience only
2007
Does risk-based compliance assessment
support the principles of modern regulation?
RMC study and case study report SC040042 2007
What futures might the Agency utilise to
evaluate its own business risks against?
A set of four (updateable and risk-based)
scenarios (for the 2050s) for the Environment
Agency to improve the robustness of its future
planning by providing a credible, consistent tool
to aid decision making processes that will be
supported by a set of robust indicators.
SC050002 2007
Can we secure better, more effective risk-
based decision-making?
Cranfield University and Environmental Policy
study. Methodology developed for assessing
flagship risk-based decisions in Agency in
response to Hampton Implementation Review.
SC070055 ongoing
3
